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Historical Crisis Committee Study Guide

Information Under Existential Pressure

Two sequential historical modules. One shared question: who controls the truth when truth itself becomes dangerous?

1. How to Use This Guide

Do not try to memorise every detail. Instead, identify your role, your information level, your likely allies and rivals, and the decision points at which your role can change the course of the crisis.

Study Guide Rule

Historical crisis debate is not about knowing the ending. It is about making decisions as if the ending is still uncertain.

If you are... Focus on...
A head of state or senior minister Trade-offs between public messaging, political legitimacy, international pressure, and emergency action.
An intelligence or security role What information is reliable, what is missing, and what should remain secret or be released.
A scientist, technical adviser, or verifier Measurement, uncertainty, technical risk, and the responsibility to challenge false confidence.
A local or affected-territory role Civilian protection, evacuation, public fear, medical readiness, and sovereignty.
A media or public narrative role How truth, propaganda, rumours, leaks, and public trust shape the crisis.

2. The Big Idea: Epistemic Security Under Pressure

Epistemic security means protecting the conditions that allow people and institutions to know what is true. In a crisis, truth does not move by itself: it has to pass through instruments, witnesses, scientists, intelligence agencies, diplomats, leaders, journalists, censors, translators, and frightened citizens. If those channels are blocked or distorted, the crisis becomes more dangerous.

  • Information is a life-saving tool. Radiation readings, evacuation notices, reconnaissance photographs, intercepted signals, and diplomatic messages can prevent disaster.

  • Information is a political weapon. States may hide, delay, exaggerate, deny, leak, or selectively release information to shape behaviour.

  • Information is fragile. A single wrong assumption can turn uncertainty into panic, delay, humiliation, or war.

  • Verification matters. Delegates should repeatedly ask: How do we know? Who measured it? Can another actor confirm it? What is the cost of waiting?

Epistemic security does not only mean fighting fake news. It means protecting the whole chain by which reliable knowledge is produced, checked, distributed, trusted, and acted upon. In this committee, that chain includes reactor instruments, hospital reports, KGB summaries, diplomatic cables, U-2 photographs, intercepted communications, press briefings, public speeches, and private messages. A crisis becomes existential when leaders cannot tell whether the information reaching them is true, incomplete, manipulated, or already too late.

  • For Chernobyl, epistemic security fails when technical evidence is delayed or subordinated to the political need to protect Soviet authority.

  • For Cuba, epistemic security fails when ambiguous signals, incomplete intelligence, and military pressure make it hard to distinguish deterrence from preparation for war.

  • For delegates, the practical question is always: what must be known publicly, what can remain classified, and who has the authority to verify the difference?

Delegate Question

In your role, are you trying to reveal the truth, control the truth, delay the truth, reinterpret the truth, or use the truth as leverage?

Crisis What is dangerous? What is hidden? What must be verified?
Chernobyl Radiation, panic, institutional denial, delayed evacuation, contaminated food and water. The scale of the reactor destruction, radiation readings, responsibility, health effects, and international fallout. Reactor status, radiation levels, evacuation need, contamination maps, public health risk, foreign detection.
Cuban Missile Crisis Nuclear escalation, misread signals, unauthorized military action, public humiliation, alliance breakdown. Soviet intentions, missile readiness, tactical nuclear weapons, private concessions, field commanders' instructions. Missile sites, ship movements, command discipline, letters and backchannels, removal of weapons, security guarantees.

3. Committee Architecture and Crisis Documents

This committee is designed as a single Historical Crisis Committee with two sequential simulations. Delegates complete the Chernobyl module first and then move to the Cuban Missile Crisis module. The two modules do not take place in the same historical timeline, but they share the same central challenge: leaders must act under conditions of incomplete, delayed, distorted, or politically dangerous information.

Core question: What happens when governments, scientists, intelligence agencies, militaries, media actors, and international institutions compete to control what is known, what is hidden, and what is believed?

Shared mandate: The committee is not simply about preventing disaster. It examines how disasters are worsened, delayed, prevented, or transformed by the management of information. In Chernobyl, delegates must decide whether to protect human life or protect the image of the state. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, delegates must decide whether to signal strength or risk nuclear miscalculation.

Public deliberation, crisis response, and private action are connected. A public speech can support an intelligence request; a technical warning can lead to an evacuation order or de-escalation proposal.

The Three-Track Crisis Model

Track Purpose Documents / Actions
Public Deliberation Open debate, evaluation of proposals, negotiation, public statements, legitimacy-building, and collective decision-making. Speeches, communiques, negotiated proposals, public commitments, protocols, and final frameworks.
Crisis Response Immediate reaction to sudden crisis updates issued by the dais. Directives, emergency orders, intelligence requests, evacuation orders, naval orders, medical plans, inspection mandates, and rules of engagement.
Backroom / Portfolio Secret or semi-secret use of role-specific leverage. Private notes, covert intelligence, controlled leaks, scientific warnings, media pressure, technical authority, diplomatic backchannels, and confidential verification.

Documents Used in This Committee

Document When to use it What it must include
Directive Immediately after a crisis update or when rapid action is needed. Actor, order, resources, timeline, verification method, risk, and expected consequence.
Public Communique When the committee needs to speak to citizens, allies, adversaries, or the international community. What is known, what is uncertain, what the public should do, what will be verified next, and when the next update will come.
Intelligence Brief When information is incomplete, classified, ambiguous, or disputed. Source type, confidence level, alternative explanations, policy implications, and recommended next step.
Emergency Protocol When recurring action is needed across several actors or institutions. Responsibilities, thresholds, communication chain, monitoring, public information rules, and accountability.
Final Framework At the end of each module. Main decisions, enforcement, verification, rights and duties, consequences, and lessons learned.

How Private Notes Work

Private notes allow a delegate to activate role-specific powers through the crisis staff. They should be specific, plausible, limited in scope, and connected to the delegate’s historical position. Private information gained through a note does not automatically become public; delegates must decide how, when, and whether to reveal it.

Private Note Element What to write
To Crisis Staff / Backroom
From Delegate name and role
Portfolio Power The specific power or authority being activated
Action What the delegate secretly does or requests
Goal What the delegate wants to achieve
Risk / Expenditure What could go wrong, or what resource, credibility, access, or political capital is being used

Backroom Rules

  • Use only powers that fit your role and historical position.

  • Do not try to solve the entire crisis with one private note.

  • Every secret action may create consequences.

  • Information gained privately is not automatically public.

  • Leaks, deception, and intelligence operations must be specific and plausible.

  • The dais may return a result as success, partial success, failure, or success with consequence.

Final Products

For Module 1, delegates should produce an Emergency Containment and Public Information Protocol. For Module 2, delegates should produce a De-escalation and Intelligence Management Framework. These products keep the two modules linked by a shared focus on information management, verification, public trust, and controlled action under pressure.

4. Module 1 - Chernobyl: The Cost of Lies

Module Thesis

Chernobyl was a nuclear disaster and an information disaster. The reactor explosion released radiation, but secrecy, delay, bureaucratic fear, and political image-management shaped how people understood and responded to the danger.

4.1 Overview

What happened? In the early hours of 26 April 1986, Reactor No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded during a late-night safety test. The explosions destroyed the reactor core and part of the building, and the accident became the worst nuclear power plant disaster of its time.

Why did it become a crisis of truth? Early Soviet responses were marked by denial, delay, and tightly controlled information. Pripyat was evacuated only after many hours, and the world learned of abnormal radiation partly because monitors in Sweden detected contamination before a full Soviet explanation was available.

Why does this matter in committee? Delegates must decide whether the state should first protect its image, prevent panic, inform citizens, alert neighbours, invite international assistance, or punish those responsible. These choices are linked: concealing information may buy time, but it may also destroy trust and expose people to danger.

Core fact Why it matters in debate
The accident occurred at 01:23 on 26 April 1986. Time pressure matters: every hour of delay affects firefighters, plant workers, Pripyat residents, and international detection.
The accident involved both technical causes and organisational failures. Delegates should avoid simplistic blame. The updated IAEA analysis stresses design weaknesses, operating practices, and safety culture.
Swedish monitoring detected fallout on 28 April. The crisis becomes international when physical evidence crosses borders faster than official statements.
Health effects include confirmed acute radiation deaths and long-term disputed estimates. Delegates must distinguish confirmed data from projections, fears, propaganda, and uncertainty.
Chernobyl led to international notification and assistance conventions. The final document can include notification rules, verification duties, and requests for international help.

4.2 Timeline for Delegates

Date / Moment Event Information problem
25-26 April 1986 A safety test is carried out under unstable conditions at Reactor No. 4. Operators, plant leaders, and ministries do not share the same understanding of risk.
01:23, 26 April Explosions destroy the core and reactor building. Early reports underestimate or misdescribe the damage; instruments and witnesses provide confusing data.
26 April Firefighters and plant personnel respond, often without full knowledge of radiation levels. Humanitarian urgency clashes with incomplete technical information.
27 April Pripyat evacuation begins after delay. Authorities need to communicate danger without causing panic or admitting catastrophic failure.
28 April Radiation is detected in Sweden at Forsmark; foreign governments ask questions. International monitoring challenges Soviet information control.
Late April-May Evacuations, decontamination, medical response, and information control expand. The state must decide what to publish, what to classify, and who to blame.
After 1986 International nuclear safety and notification rules are strengthened. Chernobyl becomes a lesson in transparency, verification, and crisis communication.

4.3 Technical Background without Panic

Chernobyl was not a normal industrial fire. Reactor physics, design vulnerabilities, emergency procedures, and human decisions interacted. INSAG-7 is especially useful because it updated earlier explanations that placed too much emphasis on operator error alone. It gives delegates a better way to understand how complex systems fail.

  • Reactor design. The RBMK design had characteristics that could become dangerous under certain low-power conditions; students do not need advanced physics, but they should know that design and procedure both mattered.

  • Safety culture. A strong safety culture means that staff can stop dangerous work, report uncertainty, and treat warning signs seriously. A weak safety culture discourages bad news.

  • Radiation monitoring. Measurements are only useful if the right instruments are available, readings are believed, and results reach people who can act.

  • Containment limits. The fire, graphite, damaged core, and contamination required technical decisions under extreme uncertainty.

Technical Deep Dive: RBMK Vulnerabilities

Positive void coefficient. The RBMK design used graphite as a moderator and water as a coolant. Under dangerous low-power conditions, boiling water could create steam voids. Because steam absorbs fewer neutrons than water while graphite continues to moderate the reaction, power could surge instead of stabilising. This matters in committee because the technical expert should be able to challenge claims that the explosion was merely a small fire or a simple operator mistake.

Graphite-tipped control rods and AZ-5. The emergency shutdown system was meant to stop the chain reaction, but the graphite tips of the control rods initially displaced neutron-absorbing water and could briefly increase reactivity before the boron absorber entered the core. This detail is essential for understanding why the official Soviet explanation later became contested.

INSAG-1 and INSAG-7. Early international explanations relied heavily on Soviet presentations and emphasised operator error. The later INSAG-7 update placed much more weight on reactor design flaws, safety culture, and systemic management failures. Delegates should therefore avoid simplistic blame and ask who knew what about the design, when they knew it, and why that knowledge was not shared with operators or the public.

Teaching Tip for Delegates

Do not use technical vocabulary to sound impressive. Use it to clarify decisions. The central question is not only "what happened in the reactor?" but "who believes which evidence, and what do they do with it?"

4.4 The Cost of Lies: Information Control and Public Health

The title "The Cost of Lies" should be interpreted carefully. Not every mistake was a deliberate lie, and not every official had the same knowledge. Some actors faced confusion, broken instruments, contradictory reports, personal fear, political pressure, or ideological loyalty. The educational value of the simulation comes from separating error, uncertainty, secrecy, propaganda, and deliberate deception.

Information behaviour Possible motivation Possible consequence
Delay public announcement Avoid panic; protect the Party and state image; wait for confirmed data. People may remain exposed; foreign governments may accuse the USSR of concealment.
Understate radiation levels Prevent fear; avoid admitting technical failure. Medical response may be too slow; credibility collapses later.
Classify technical reports Protect national security and industrial secrets. Scientists cannot challenge false assumptions; foreign aid is delayed.
Release partial truth Maintain some credibility while controlling the narrative. Can calm the public if honest about uncertainty; can also look evasive.
Invite international verification Increase trust and access external expertise. May be seen as humiliating or as opening the USSR to foreign criticism.

Health effects and uncertainty. Delegates should use cautious language. UNSCEAR reports that 134 workers suffered acute radiation sickness, with 28 deaths in the first three months; WHO and UNSCEAR also highlight a major increase in thyroid cancer among people who were children or adolescents in affected areas. Long-term death estimates vary greatly, so students should present uncertainty rather than weaponising exaggerated figures.

Political Response, Accountability, and Information Control

The political crisis was not only about whether the Soviet Union could extinguish a reactor fire. It was about whether the Soviet system could admit that a prestigious technological project had failed. Declassified Politburo material and KGB-related archives show a pattern of internal alarm, search for responsibility, and pressure to manage the story before foreign governments and journalists defined it.

Boris Shcherbina and the emergency commission therefore become especially important playable roles. They must turn technical warnings into buses, hospital capacity, decontamination units, exclusion zones, and honest reporting lines. If they move too slowly, civilians remain exposed; if they move too visibly, they may reveal the scale of the disaster before Moscow is ready to admit it.

For KGB and state media roles, the lesson is strategic: suppressing leaks may protect order in the short term, but suppressing accurate technical information can make the physical disaster worse and make later diplomatic damage unavoidable.

4.5 International Dimension: When Radiation Crosses Borders

Chernobyl proves that national secrecy has international limits. Fallout detected outside the USSR made the accident impossible to treat as a purely internal matter. Swedish monitoring at Forsmark on 28 April showed that scientific instruments abroad could reveal what official statements did not yet explain.

  • Neighbouring states. States affected by fallout needed information about wind, food safety, water, iodine, agriculture, and travel.

  • IAEA and international law. The 1986 Early Notification Convention and Assistance Convention were adopted after Chernobyl and provide useful models for the final protocol.

  • Foreign media and embassies. Diplomats and journalists can pressure Soviet authorities, but they can also spread rumours if facts are incomplete.

  • Cold War competition. The United States and allies may use the disaster to criticise Soviet secrecy, but excessive propaganda could undermine genuine public health cooperation.

4.6 Suggested Debate Questions

  1. Should Pripyat be evacuated immediately, gradually, or only after confirmed radiation readings? Who has authority to decide?

  2. What information must be released to Soviet citizens even if it harms the state image?

  3. Should foreign governments be informed before a full Soviet technical assessment is complete?

  4. How can the committee avoid panic while avoiding deception?

  5. Should the committee blame plant operators, reactor design, ministries, or the wider Soviet system?

  6. What role should the IAEA or foreign specialists have in a Soviet disaster?

  7. Should state media be used to calm, inform, distract, or mobilise the public?

  8. How should health effects be communicated when the science is uncertain and politically sensitive?

4.7 Expected Final Product: Emergency Containment and Public Information Protocol

A strong final protocol should be practical, not rhetorical. It should contain:

  • Evacuation thresholds, transport plans, and reception sites for civilians.

  • Radiation monitoring rules: who measures, who verifies, how often, and where results go.

  • Medical triage and long-term health monitoring, especially for workers, children, and pregnant people.

  • Food, water, livestock, and agriculture restrictions tied to measurements.

  • Public information rules that separate confirmed facts, uncertainty, and protective advice.

  • International notification procedures and conditions for external technical assistance.

  • Accountability mechanisms for misinformation, negligence, or obstruction.

5. Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis: SIGINT and Brinkmanship

Module Thesis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was not simply a contest of strength. It was a contest over signals: photographs, intercepted communications, public speeches, private letters, naval movements, silence, threats, and concessions.

5.1 Student-Friendly Overview

What happened? In October 1962, U.S. U-2 reconnaissance photographs revealed Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction in Cuba. President Kennedy and his advisers debated air strikes, invasion, blockade/quarantine, diplomacy, and secret compromise. For thirteen days, the public crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to nuclear war.

Why is this an information crisis? Leaders acted on incomplete intelligence. They had to judge whether missiles were operational, whether Soviet ships would challenge the quarantine, whether Khrushchev controlled all commanders, whether Castro might push escalation, and whether public threats left room for private compromise.

Core concept Meaning for delegates
SIGINT Signals intelligence: intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems such as communications, radar, and weapons systems.
IMINT Imagery intelligence: photographs and images. In this crisis, U-2 imagery was crucial to proving missile sites existed.
Brinkmanship Pushing a confrontation close to disaster so the other side backs down. It can deter, but it can also create accidental war.
Backchannel Secret or unofficial communication used to explore compromise when public statements are too rigid.
Verification Confirming that missiles, bombers, warheads, or ships have actually moved or changed status.

5.2 Timeline for Delegates

Date / Moment Event Information problem
14-15 October 1962 U-2 photographs are taken and interpreted as evidence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. How much confidence is enough to confront a nuclear rival?
16 October Kennedy is briefed; EXCOMM discussions begin in secret. Public silence preserves options but can look deceptive if leaked.
22 October Kennedy announces the missiles publicly and declares a naval quarantine. A public signal must be firm enough to deter, but not so rigid that compromise becomes impossible.
24 October Naval confrontation fears intensify as Soviet ships approach quarantine lines. Ship movements are signals, but they may be delayed, ambiguous, or misread.
26 October A Khrushchev message suggests missile removal in exchange for a U.S. non-invasion pledge. Which Soviet message is real policy: emotional appeal, formal demand, or bargaining tactic?
27 October A second Khrushchev message demands removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey; a U-2 is shot down over Cuba. Black Saturday: escalation pressure peaks and multiple incidents compete for attention.
28 October Khrushchev agrees to remove missiles; private understandings help end the public crisis. The public solution hides parts of the private bargain.
After October Verification and removal continue; later evidence shows U.S. intelligence did not know everything. The crisis did not fully end when the public thought it had ended.

5.3 Intelligence: What Was Known, Unknown, and Misread

A central lesson is that intelligence is not the same as certainty. The NSA history stresses that SIGINT did not directly reveal the introduction of offensive ballistic missiles before U-2 imagery proved the installations, but SIGINT supported day-to-day management of the crisis once the missiles were discovered.

Information source Strength Weakness / risk
U-2 imagery Provided visual evidence of missile sites. Flights could be shot down; images require interpretation and may not show warheads.
SIGINT Helped monitor communications, radar, and military activity. Did not give the decisive warning that missiles were being installed.
HUMINT / refugee reports Could warn of unusual activity on the island. Could generate many reports with uneven reliability.
Diplomatic statements Can signal intentions and offer exits. May be deliberately ambiguous or designed for public audiences.
Naval movements Can show whether ships comply or challenge the quarantine. Movements can be misread, delayed, or affected by orders not yet received.

Hidden danger. Later declassified evidence shows that the nuclear danger was greater than U.S. leaders knew at the time. The National Security Archive notes that Soviet nuclear warheads arrived in Cuba on 4 October 1962 and that U.S. intelligence did not detect them while they were there. This is essential for simulation design: delegates should not assume leaders know everything that historians know now.

SIGINT Before the Photographs

U.S. signals intelligence and related reporting had tracked suspicious Soviet shipping, unusual cargo secrecy, night unloading procedures, Cuban pilot training, air-defence signals, and radar activity before U-2 imagery provided the decisive photographic proof of missile sites.

This means the American intelligence role should not speak as if one photograph magically created all knowledge. Intelligence is cumulative: analysts build confidence by comparing shipping patterns, radar emissions, communications, human reports, aerial images, and diplomatic behaviour.

At the same time, SIGINT had limits. It helped manage the crisis once discovered, but it did not give leaders complete knowledge of Soviet warheads, submarine weapons, field orders, or the exact intentions of Khrushchev and Castro. This is why a good intelligence brief must include confidence levels and alternative interpretations.

5.4 Brinkmanship and Escalation Control

Brinkmanship is a dangerous performance. Each side tries to look firm enough to force the other to retreat, but the performance itself creates risk. A quarantine, a missile alert, a reconnaissance flight, a ship refusing to stop, a public accusation at the UN, or a threatening broadcast can all be read as signals of resolve or as preparations for war.

  • Credible threat. A threat only works if the other side believes it might be carried out.

  • Reversibility. The safest pressure is often pressure that can be paused, delayed, or withdrawn without humiliation.

  • Command discipline. Central leaders may want caution while field commanders face immediate local threats.

  • Accidental war. Nuclear crises can escalate because of incidents no leader fully intended.

  • Face-saving exits. A settlement is easier when both sides can claim something: security, dignity, or restraint.

Black Saturday as simulation model. 27 October is ideal for crisis debate because several dangers converged: a U-2 was shot down over Cuba, another U-2 accidentally strayed near Soviet airspace, the Turkey question entered the negotiation, and Soviet submarine B-59 was pressured by U.S. Navy signals while carrying a nuclear torpedo. The B-59 incident shows why even signalling devices can be misread under stress.

Underwater Crisis: Submarine B-59

The B-59 incident is one of the clearest examples of epistemic insecurity. U.S. forces used non-lethal practice depth charges to signal a Soviet submarine to surface; Soviet officers on board, cut off from clear communication and operating under extreme stress, could interpret the same signals as signs that war had already begun.

In committee terms, this means rules of engagement must be written so that field commanders know what a signal means before the crisis reaches them. A message that seems clear in Washington may be terrifyingly ambiguous underwater, in a cockpit, at a missile site, or inside a damaged reactor building.

5.5 Public and Private Diplomacy

Public diplomacy creates legitimacy; private diplomacy creates flexibility. Kennedy needed to appear firm. Khrushchev needed to avoid humiliation. Castro needed to defend Cuban sovereignty. Publicly, the United States framed the quarantine as a defensive action against offensive weapons. Privately, the settlement involved a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and a secret understanding connected to U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Diplomatic channel Useful for Risk
Televised speech Mobilising public support and warning the adversary. Locks leaders into public promises.
UN Security Council debate Presenting evidence and winning international legitimacy. Turns crisis into public humiliation contest.
Private letters Testing compromise and reducing misunderstanding. Messages may be ambiguous, delayed, or contradicted.
Backchannels Exploring concessions without public embarrassment. Can bypass allies or smaller states such as Cuba.
UN mediation Creating pause, face-saving language, and neutral communication. May be rejected by superpowers who fear losing control.

U Thant. UN Secretary-General U Thant should not be treated as a decorative role. His mediation proposals sought restraint and a pause in provocative actions, creating space for de-escalation.

ExComm, Armageddon Letters, and Backchannel Pressure

There had been extraordinary pressure inside the U.S. Executive Committee (ExComm). Civilian and military advisers debated air strikes, invasion, quarantine, diplomacy, and secret compromise while the administration publicly maintained discipline. This is useful for delegates because it shows that internal disagreement is not weakness; it can be a way to test the risks of each option before acting.

The Armageddon Letters project is especially helpful for teenage delegates because it presents Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro as leaders under psychological pressure, not as abstract symbols. The correspondence shows how public threats and private appeals can exist at the same time.

5.6 Cuba and Sovereignty

Cuba is not just a location on the map. A strong simulation should give Cuban roles real agency. From the Cuban perspective, the crisis was about survival after the Bay of Pigs invasion and continuing U.S. hostility. Cuban leaders feared being attacked and also feared being used as bargaining chips by the Soviet Union.

  • Cuban leaders may demand a voice in any settlement concerning Cuban territory.

  • Cuban military readiness can be defensive but still dangerous if it triggers U.S. escalation.

  • Cuba may resist inspections that appear to violate sovereignty.

  • The Soviet Union may need Cuban cooperation to implement missile withdrawal without appearing to abandon an ally.

5.7 Suggested Debate Questions

  1. Should the United States respond with quarantine, air strike, invasion, secret negotiation, or a combination?

  2. What level of intelligence confidence is enough before military action?

  3. Should Kennedy publicly reveal all evidence, or only enough to build legitimacy?

  4. How should Soviet leaders signal willingness to compromise without appearing weak?

  5. Should Cuba accept external verification on its territory?

  6. How can naval commanders avoid accidental conflict at sea?

  7. Should the Turkey missile question be public, private, or excluded from the crisis?

  8. What role should the United Nations play when superpowers are close to war?

5.8 Expected Final Product: De-escalation and Intelligence Management Framework

A strong final framework should include:

  • Rules of engagement for naval, air, and field commanders.

  • Confidence levels for intelligence reports and procedures for challenging false certainty.

  • Public and private communication channels, including backchannel safeguards.

  • Verification process for missile removal, bomber removal, warhead status, and non-escalation.

  • Security guarantees or concessions, including how they are communicated and recorded.

  • Role for the UN or neutral observers, if politically acceptable.

  • Mechanisms to avoid accidental war: hotlines, notification of exercises, and incident reporting.

6. Delegate Profiles and Research Matrix

The committee contains 20 delegate seats, each with one role in each module. Prepare each role using the authority, information, and responsibilities available at that historical moment. Cooperation develops during debate.

Named roles represent historical office-holders. Composite roles are labelled explicitly. Swedish and British prime ministers hold the offices appropriate to 1986 and 1962; each role acts within its own national authority.

Role preparation method: Prepare two speeches for each module: one public speech that fits your official position, and one private strategy note that reveals what your role actually wants.

Paired Role Overview

Seat Country / Ideological Archetype Module 1: Chernobyl Module 2: Cuban Missile Crisis
1 Soviet / Communist Supreme Leader Mikhail Gorbachev — General Secretary of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev — First Secretary of the CPSU
2 American Supreme Leader Ronald Reagan — President of the United States John F. Kennedy — President of the United States
3 Soviet / Communist Crisis Coordinator Boris Shcherbina — Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers / Head of the Government Commission Anastas Mikoyan — Soviet Senior Negotiator / Presidium Envoy
4 American Defence Executive Caspar Weinberger — U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara — U.S. Secretary of Defense
5 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze — Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko — Soviet Foreign Minister
6 American Foreign Minister George Shultz — U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk — U.S. Secretary of State
7 Soviet Intelligence / Internal Security Chief Viktor Chebrikov — Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Semichastny — Chairman of the KGB
8 American Intelligence Chief William Casey — Director of Central Intelligence John McCone — Director of Central Intelligence
9 Soviet / Communist Technical Expert Valery Legasov — Soviet Nuclear Scientist Soviet Missile Technical Adviser — Composite Role
10 American Technical / Science Adviser U.S. Nuclear Safety Adviser — Composite Role Jerome Wiesner — U.S. Presidential Science Adviser
11 Communist Affected-Territory Leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky — First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Fidel Castro — Prime Minister of Cuba
12 Communist Local Civilian Authority Pripyat City Executive Committee Representative — Composite Role Havana Civil Defence Representative — Composite Role
13 Soviet / Communist Site Commander Viktor Bryukhanov — Director of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Issa Pliyev — Commander of Soviet Forces in Cuba
14 Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson — Prime Minister of Sweden Tage Erlander — Prime Minister of Sweden
15 Communist Military / Civil Defence Authority Red Army Chemical & Decontamination Commander — Composite Role Raúl Castro — Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba
16 Soviet / Communist State Media TASS / Soviet State Media Representative — Composite Role Soviet State Media / Radio Moscow Representative — Composite Role
17 American Public Narrative / Press Office White House Communications Representative — Composite Role Pierre Salinger — White House Press Secretary
18 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher — Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Harold Macmillan — Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
19 International Verifier / Mediator Hans Blix — Director General of the IAEA U Thant — United Nations Secretary-General
20 Independent International Press International Press Correspondent — Composite Role International Press Correspondent — Composite Role

Strategic Role Clusters

The following role groups identify research priorities and areas of responsibility.

Role cluster Strategic value How to use it in committee
State power and executives Gorbachev/Khrushchev and Reagan/Kennedy carry prestige, authority, and the risk of filtered information. Demand raw briefings, test rival narratives, and avoid being trapped by your own public promises.
Intelligence and internal security Security roles control leaks and sources, but excessive secrecy can blind the state. Use private notes to verify information; include confidence levels instead of pretending to know everything.
Science and technical operations Physics, engineering, missile readiness, and reactor design can contradict political narratives. Translate technical evidence into practical orders: evacuation, inspection, non-escalation, or containment.
Affected territory and sovereignty Ukraine/Pripyat and Cuba are not passive settings; local actors bear the human cost. Use local mobilisation, civil defence, and sovereignty arguments to force superpower roles to consider civilians.
Public narrative and press Narrative control can calm, deceive, expose, or destabilise the crisis. Verify before publishing or broadcasting; a false claim can destroy credibility and increase panic.

How to Read a Delegate Profile

Each profile combines research focus, public position, private objective, portfolio power, information access, likely allies, possible rivals, and a sample private note. The public position is what the delegate can openly argue. The private objective is what the delegate may pursue strategically. The portfolio power is the special ability that can be activated through a private note to the dais.

Individual Delegate Profiles

Seat 1 - Soviet / Communist Supreme Leader

Research focus: How leaders balance truth, prestige, reform, and regime survival.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Mikhail Gorbachev — General Secretary of the CPSU

Public position: The Soviet state is capable, calm, and in control of the emergency.

Private objective: Protect reform, party authority, and Soviet credibility while avoiding an undeniable human catastrophe.

Portfolio power: General Secretary’s Line: order ministries to prioritise, release, delay, or reclassify information.

Information access: Top-level Soviet briefings, KGB summaries, ministry reports, political risk assessments.

Sample private note: I order all ministries to deliver unfiltered radiation readings to my office before any public statement is approved.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Nikita Khrushchev — First Secretary of the CPSU

Public position: Soviet actions are defensive and protect Cuba from invasion.

Private objective: Preserve Soviet prestige while finding a survivable path away from nuclear war.

Portfolio power: Kremlin Signal: send public threats, secret offers, or ambiguous messages to shape U.S. calculations.

Information access: Soviet military reports, diplomatic cables, Cuban requests, intelligence warnings.

Sample private note: I send a private message offering missile withdrawal in exchange for a U.S. non-invasion pledge and discreet discussion of Turkey.

Seat 2 - American Supreme Leader

Research focus: How presidents use public pressure, intelligence, and restraint.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Ronald Reagan — President of the United States

Public position: Any nuclear accident with cross-border effects requires clarity and responsible international communication.

Private objective: Expose dangerous Soviet secrecy without turning the disaster into uncontrolled Cold War propaganda.

Portfolio power: Presidential Pressure: coordinate diplomatic pressure, public statements, intelligence releases, and allied consultation.

Information access: CIA assessments, allied radiation reports, embassy cables, media briefings.

Sample private note: I instruct U.S. agencies to compare allied radiation reports with intelligence indicators before making a public accusation.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: John F. Kennedy — President of the United States

Public position: The United States will act firmly but responsibly to protect the hemisphere.

Private objective: Remove the missiles without triggering nuclear war or appearing weak.

Portfolio power: Presidential Authority: approve quarantine, public messaging, backchannels, and military readiness levels.

Information access: EXCOMM summaries, intelligence estimates, military advice, diplomatic signals.

Sample private note: I authorize a private channel to test whether a non-invasion pledge can secure verified missile withdrawal.

Seat 3 - Soviet / Communist Crisis Coordinator

Research focus: How emergency coordinators turn orders into practical action.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Boris Shcherbina — Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers / Head of the Government Commission

Public position: The commission will coordinate containment, evacuation, and technical assessment.

Private objective: Force the system to act before bureaucratic delay makes the disaster irreversible.

Portfolio power: Emergency Commission Orders: coordinate ministries, transport, medical response, technical teams, and field reporting.

Information access: Plant data, local reports, expert advice, political instructions from Moscow.

Sample private note: I order an immediate field commission meeting and require the plant team to provide raw reactor-status data.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Anastas Mikoyan — Soviet Senior Negotiator / Presidium Envoy

Public position: The Soviet Union seeks security for Cuba and a dignified political solution.

Private objective: Find a settlement that Khrushchev can accept without making the Soviet retreat look like surrender.

Portfolio power: Presidium Troubleshooter: carry compromise proposals, calm Cuban anger, and test backchannel formulas.

Information access: Kremlin instructions, Cuban concerns, diplomatic messages, negotiation space.

Sample private note: I quietly ask Cuban representatives what minimum security assurance would make missile withdrawal politically survivable.

Seat 4 - American Defence Executive

Research focus: How military options can deter but also escalate.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Caspar Weinberger — U.S. Secretary of Defense

Public position: The United States must understand whether the accident creates wider security or environmental risks.

Private objective: Avoid military panic while ensuring the U.S. is not strategically blind.

Portfolio power: Strategic Readiness Review: request defence assessments, military monitoring, and contingency planning.

Information access: Defence intelligence summaries, allied military alerts, technical-security assessments.

Sample private note: I request a classified assessment of whether the disaster affects Soviet military readiness or nuclear safety practices.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Robert McNamara — U.S. Secretary of Defense

Public position: Military pressure must be controlled, legal, and reversible.

Private objective: Keep the President from choosing an option that accidentally triggers war.

Portfolio power: Defence Coordination: coordinate quarantine planning, readiness levels, and military options.

Information access: Pentagon plans, naval reports, air strike options, rules of engagement.

Sample private note: I revise quarantine rules of engagement to require repeated warning signals before any use of force.

Seat 5 - Soviet Foreign Minister

Research focus: How diplomatic language protects bargaining space.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Eduard Shevardnadze — Soviet Foreign Minister

Public position: The USSR will communicate responsibly while rejecting hostile exploitation of the accident.

Private objective: Prevent international isolation without forcing Moscow into humiliating full disclosure too early.

Portfolio power: Diplomatic Language Control: shape diplomatic notes, manage foreign requests, and negotiate wording of public statements.

Information access: Foreign cables, embassy reactions, allied pressure, public-message drafts.

Sample private note: I draft a statement acknowledging an incident while avoiding technical claims we cannot yet verify.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Andrei Gromyko — Soviet Foreign Minister

Public position: The missiles question must be discussed within the wider issue of U.S. threats to Cuba.

Private objective: Protect Soviet bargaining space and avoid an admission that weakens Khrushchev.

Portfolio power: Diplomatic Framing: control diplomatic wording, deny or deflect accusations, and open formal negotiation channels.

Information access: Soviet diplomatic instructions, U.S. public statements, UN pressure.

Sample private note: I prepare a UN statement insisting on Cuban security guarantees before any discussion of Soviet military assets.

Seat 6 - American Foreign Minister

Research focus: How alliances, legality, and negotiation shape action.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: George Shultz — U.S. Secretary of State

Public position: The Soviet Union must provide reliable information to affected states and international bodies.

Private objective: Use diplomacy to expose concealment while keeping open a channel for cooperation.

Portfolio power: Western Diplomatic Pressure: coordinate allied statements, demarches, and demands for verification.

Information access: Embassy cables, allied diplomatic reports, public Soviet statements.

Sample private note: I instruct allied embassies to request identical radiation and evacuation data so inconsistencies become visible.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Dean Rusk — U.S. Secretary of State

Public position: The United States seeks removal of offensive weapons through firm but lawful pressure.

Private objective: Keep a negotiated exit open while preserving alliance unity.

Portfolio power: Diplomatic Channel Management: coordinate diplomatic messages, alliance consultation, and public legal framing.

Information access: State Department cables, allied views, Soviet responses, UN discussions.

Sample private note: I ask our UN team to frame quarantine as a temporary security measure, not a declaration of war.

Seat 7 - Soviet Intelligence / Internal Security Chief

Research focus: How secrecy, surveillance, and counterintelligence affect truth.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Viktor Chebrikov — Chairman of the KGB

Public position: Rumours and panic must be contained to protect public order and state security.

Private objective: Control leaks and identify who may expose state negligence.

Portfolio power: Internal Security Net: monitor officials, restrict documents, trace leaks, and screen foreign contacts.

Information access: Internal reports, surveillance summaries, leak indicators, restricted communications.

Sample private note: I monitor plant communications and identify whether any technician has contacted foreign journalists.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Vladimir Semichastny — Chairman of the KGB

Public position: Soviet security requires discipline, secrecy, and reliable channels.

Private objective: Protect Soviet operations and prevent U.S. intelligence from reading Soviet intentions too clearly.

Portfolio power: KGB Counterintelligence Screen: screen communications, protect Soviet secrets, and identify leaks or disloyal actors.

Information access: KGB reports, Soviet military security warnings, embassy-channel risks.

Sample private note: I review embassy communications for leak risks before any sensitive offer is sent to Washington.

Seat 8 - American Intelligence Chief

Research focus: How intelligence estimates separate evidence from assumption.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: William Casey — Director of Central Intelligence

Public position: The United States must verify Soviet claims independently.

Private objective: Discover the scale of the disaster before public Soviet admissions catch up.

Portfolio power: Intelligence Correlation: compare satellite indicators, allied readings, embassy information, and intercepted signals.

Information access: CIA assessments, satellite indicators, allied technical data, embassy rumours.

Sample private note: I cross-check allied radiation readings with satellite imagery of emergency activity near the plant.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: John McCone — Director of Central Intelligence

Public position: Policy must be based on verified intelligence, not assumptions.

Private objective: Ensure Kennedy understands both the missile threat and the uncertainty in the evidence.

Portfolio power: Intelligence Estimate: deliver classified estimates, challenge false confidence, and request further reconnaissance.

Information access: U-2 imagery, CIA reports, SIGINT summaries, Soviet movement assessments.

Sample private note: I request one more reconnaissance pass before any air-strike recommendation is treated as final.

Seat 9 - Soviet / Communist Technical Expert

Research focus: How technical facts challenge political narratives.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Valery Legasov — Soviet Nuclear Scientist

Public position: Decisions must be based on reactor physics and radiation evidence, not political convenience.

Private objective: Force the leadership to accept the scale of the disaster before more people are exposed.

Portfolio power: Technical Truth: provide technical assessments, challenge false reports, and recommend containment measures.

Information access: Reactor data, radiation readings, expert calculations, containment feasibility.

Sample private note: I prepare a classified technical brief showing why the explosion cannot be described as a minor fire.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Soviet Missile Technical Adviser — Composite Role

Public position: Operational decisions must reflect the real readiness and vulnerability of missile sites.

Private objective: Prevent leaders from making threats based on inaccurate assumptions about missile readiness.

Portfolio power: Launch-Site Technical Assessment: clarify missile readiness, launch-site vulnerability, and technical risk.

Information access: Missile-site reports, readiness estimates, field communications, technical constraints.

Sample private note: I report privately whether the missile sites are truly operational or still vulnerable to disruption.

Seat 10 - American Technical / Science Adviser

Research focus: How scientific uncertainty should guide policy.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: U.S. Nuclear Safety Adviser — Composite Role

Public position: International health and safety require verifiable technical information.

Private objective: Separate genuine safety concern from propaganda pressure.

Portfolio power: Technical Verification Request: analyse radiation reports, recommend questions for the Soviets, and brief U.S. leaders.

Information access: Scientific assessments, allied measurements, nuclear-safety comparisons.

Sample private note: I produce a list of technical questions that Soviet officials must answer for international safety verification.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Jerome Wiesner — U.S. Presidential Science Adviser

Public position: Military choices must be tested against the technical realities of nuclear escalation.

Private objective: Keep scientific uncertainty visible in the President’s options.

Portfolio power: Scientific Risk Counsel: advise on nuclear risk, verification, and the consequences of escalation.

Information access: Scientific risk assessments, nuclear effects estimates, verification options.

Sample private note: I brief the President on the difference between a controllable naval encounter and an uncontrollable nuclear escalation chain.

Seat 11 - Communist Affected-Territory Leader

Research focus: How local survival and sovereignty complicate superpower decisions.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Volodymyr Shcherbytsky — First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine

Public position: The Ukrainian SSR will cooperate with Moscow and maintain public order.

Private objective: Protect Ukrainian civilians and institutions without openly defying the Kremlin.

Portfolio power: Republic-Level Mobilisation: pressure local authorities, hospitals, police, and transport networks.

Information access: Regional casualty reports, evacuation readiness, local party communications.

Sample private note: I discreetly prepare buses and medical reception points around Pripyat without announcing a full evacuation yet.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Fidel Castro — Prime Minister of Cuba

Public position: Cuba will not be treated as a pawn between superpowers.

Private objective: Secure Cuban survival and avoid a settlement that sacrifices Cuban sovereignty.

Portfolio power: Revolutionary Mobilisation: activate Cuban defence readiness, public resistance, or diplomatic protest.

Information access: Cuban military reports, Soviet communications, public mood in Havana.

Sample private note: I order Cuban forces to increase readiness but instruct commanders not to fire unless Cuban territory is directly attacked.

Seat 12 - Communist Local Civilian Authority

Research focus: How civil defence protects people without creating panic.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Pripyat City Executive Committee Representative — Composite Role

Public position: Local order must be preserved while instructions from higher authorities are followed.

Private objective: Move civilians out of danger before delays become fatal.

Portfolio power: Local Evacuation Network: prepare buses, hospitals, schools, police cordons, and local announcements.

Information access: Local rumours, hospital admissions, transport capacity, police reports.

Sample private note: I quietly identify buses and routes for a rapid evacuation if Moscow authorises it.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Havana Civil Defence Representative — Composite Role

Public position: Cuban civilians must be prepared without creating panic.

Private objective: Protect Havana’s population if the superpowers miscalculate.

Portfolio power: Urban Defence Network: prepare shelters, medical posts, public instructions, and local defence coordination.

Information access: Civilian mood, local readiness, shelter capacity, defence alerts.

Sample private note: I prepare public safety instructions for air-raid conditions but keep the announcement sealed until authorised.

Seat 13 - Soviet / Communist Site Commander

Research focus: How field command and record control affect accountability.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Viktor Bryukhanov — Director of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

Public position: Plant management will provide order and technical cooperation.

Private objective: Limit personal and institutional blame while retaining influence over the official account.

Portfolio power: Plant Command Chain: control plant records, staff access, technical logs, and site-level reporting.

Information access: Plant logs, staff testimony, site damage reports, internal communications.

Sample private note: I secure the plant logs and prepare a version of events that emphasises equipment failure over management responsibility.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Issa Pliyev — Commander of Soviet Forces in Cuba

Public position: Soviet forces in Cuba are defensive and disciplined.

Private objective: Maintain readiness without allowing a field incident to decide the fate of the world.

Portfolio power: Field Command Authority: control Soviet field readiness, communications discipline, and local military posture.

Information access: Field reports, missile-site readiness, Cuban military coordination, Soviet orders.

Sample private note: I instruct Soviet units to hold fire unless directly attacked and report all U.S. overflights immediately.

Seat 14 - Swedish Prime Minister

Research focus: Public protection, verified information, and diplomatic choices within national authority.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Ingvar Carlsson — Prime Minister of Sweden

Public position: Sweden requires reliable information about cross-border fallout and protective measures.

Private objective: Obtain verified contamination data while maintaining public trust.

Portfolio power: Simulation portfolio: request Swedish monitoring reports, coordinate national public advice, and seek diplomatic clarification.

Information access: Swedish monitoring reports and diplomatic replies; no automatic access to Soviet internal reports.

Sample private note: I request independently checked radiation measurements and a briefing on food and water precautions.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Tage Erlander — Prime Minister of Sweden

Public position: Reduce nuclear danger while preserving Sweden’s non-aligned position.

Private objective: Keep diplomatic communication open and assess risks to Swedish security.

Portfolio power: Simulation portfolio: request national security assessments and communicate through Swedish diplomatic channels.

Information access: Swedish diplomatic reporting and public statements; no automatic access to classified superpower intelligence.

Sample private note: I ask Swedish diplomats to assess opportunities for restraint and report confirmed information separately from rumours.

Seat 15 - Communist Military / Civil Defence Authority

Research focus: How readiness protects territory but risks provocation.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Red Army Chemical & Decontamination Commander — Composite Role

Public position: Military containment units will secure and decontaminate affected zones.

Private objective: Gain authority and resources before political delay worsens exposure of troops and civilians.

Portfolio power: Containment Deployment: move troops, cordon zones, decontaminate areas, and enforce restricted access.

Information access: Field radiation readings, unit readiness, logistical needs, restricted-zone reports.

Sample private note: I deploy decontamination units to key roads and request authority to restrict entry into high-radiation areas.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Raúl Castro — Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba

Public position: Cuba will defend itself against invasion or coercion.

Private objective: Maintain deterrence without provoking an attack that Cuba cannot survive alone.

Portfolio power: Revolutionary Defence Readiness: mobilise Cuban forces, coordinate with Soviet units, and control defensive posture.

Information access: Cuban military readiness, local defence plans, Soviet-Cuban coordination.

Sample private note: I raise readiness around key installations but forbid local commanders from firing without central authorisation.

Seat 16 - Soviet / Communist State Media

Research focus: How official narrative can calm, deceive, or mobilise.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: TASS / Soviet State Media Representative — Composite Role

Public position: Public communication must preserve calm and prevent hostile exaggeration.

Private objective: Control the first version of the story before foreign media defines it.

Portfolio power: Official Narrative: draft official statements, delay details, frame blame, or announce controlled transparency.

Information access: Approved talking points, censorship instructions, rumours of foreign coverage.

Sample private note: I release a brief statement acknowledging an incident but avoiding radiation figures until ministries agree on wording.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Soviet State Media / Radio Moscow Representative — Composite Role

Public position: The Soviet position must be heard against U.S. accusations and war rhetoric.

Private objective: Frame the crisis as U.S. aggression while keeping room for a face-saving settlement.

Portfolio power: Soviet Global Broadcast: broadcast official lines, amplify Soviet proposals, and counter U.S. messaging.

Information access: Approved Kremlin language, foreign reactions, propaganda opportunities.

Sample private note: I prepare two broadcast versions: one hard-line response and one compromise-framing response, depending on the next U.S. move.

Seat 17 - American Public Narrative / Press Office

Research focus: How democratic messaging balances transparency and secrecy.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: White House Communications Representative — Composite Role

Public position: The public deserves calm, accurate, and responsible information about international nuclear risk.

Private objective: Frame the crisis so Soviet secrecy appears dangerous without causing unnecessary panic.

Portfolio power: Western Public Framing: shape presidential statements, press lines, and public explanation of U.S. concerns.

Information access: White House guidance, press questions, intelligence-cleared talking points.

Sample private note: I prepare a statement that distinguishes confirmed radiation data from unverified claims of Soviet negligence.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Pierre Salinger — White House Press Secretary

Public position: The administration will communicate firmly without revealing sensitive intelligence.

Private objective: Prevent leaks or careless wording from narrowing Kennedy’s options.

Portfolio power: Presidential Message Discipline: manage press briefings, public tone, and controlled release of information.

Information access: Press questions, White House guidance, declassified talking points.

Sample private note: I draft language that signals resolve but avoids promising military action the President has not approved.

Seat 18 - British Prime Minister

Research focus: Public protection, verified information, and diplomatic choices within national authority.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Margaret Thatcher — Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Public position: Protect the British public and seek credible Soviet disclosure.

Private objective: Secure reliable technical information while keeping international communication open.

Portfolio power: Simulation portfolio: request British monitoring and health assessments, coordinate public advice, and make diplomatic representations.

Information access: British technical assessments, diplomatic reporting, and information voluntarily shared by partners.

Sample private note: I request a verified fallout assessment and ask Moscow for information needed to protect the public.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: Harold Macmillan — Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Public position: Protect British security and consult Washington on measures to reduce nuclear danger.

Private objective: Preserve consultation with the United States while encouraging a diplomatic settlement.

Portfolio power: Simulation portfolio: communicate with Washington, request British security briefings, and propose diplomatic measures; no command over U.S. forces.

Information access: British diplomatic and defence reporting and information shared by the United States.

Sample private note: I seek urgent consultation with President Kennedy on escalation risks and options for a negotiated settlement.

Seat 19 - International Verifier / Mediator

Research focus: How neutral actors create verification, pauses, and trust.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: Hans Blix — Director General of the IAEA

Public position: Nuclear safety requires transparent technical cooperation beyond ideology.

Private objective: Gain access to reliable data before the disaster becomes a precedent for total secrecy.

Portfolio power: International Verification Request: request inspections, technical briefings, and international safety coordination.

Information access: IAEA protocols, member-state reports, technical safety standards, diplomatic limitations.

Sample private note: I formally request technical data and offer an international expert team to assist without assigning blame publicly.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: U Thant — United Nations Secretary-General

Public position: The world must step back from the edge of nuclear war through communication and restraint.

Private objective: Create a pause long enough for both superpowers to accept a face-saving compromise.

Portfolio power: Mediation Appeal: propose pauses, mediation language, and channels for de-escalation.

Information access: UN diplomatic traffic, public appeals, positions of non-aligned states.

Sample private note: I propose a temporary pause in provocative actions while both sides exchange verified guarantees through the UN.

Seat 20 - Independent International Press

Research focus: How journalism verifies claims while resisting manipulation.

Module 1 - Chernobyl

Role: International Press Correspondent — Composite Role

Public position: The public has a right to know what governments are hiding.

Private objective: Break the story first without publishing unverifiable claims that destroy credibility.

Portfolio power: Investigative Leak: publish reports, cultivate sources, or pressure officials through questioning.

Information access: Rumours, eyewitnesses, diplomatic hints, scientific claims, official denials.

Sample private note: I seek confirmation from two independent scientific sources before reporting that radiation has crossed borders.

Module 2 - Cuban Missile Crisis

Role: International Press Correspondent — Composite Role

Public position: The world must understand how close the crisis is to war.

Private objective: Reveal enough truth to inform the public without causing panic or burning sources.

Portfolio power: Global Narrative Pressure: publish leaks, challenge spokespeople, and shape international perception.

Information access: Press briefings, leaks, UN rumours, naval reports, public fear.

Sample private note: I ask public questions about whether backchannel talks exist, forcing officials to manage rumours of compromise.

7. Comparative Lessons for Delegates

Lesson Chernobyl example Cuban Missile Crisis example
Truth can be delayed, but reality leaks. Radiation crosses borders and foreign monitors detect it. U-2 imagery and ship movements expose secret deployments.
Uncertainty is not ignorance. Officials may know danger exists without knowing exact radiation levels. Leaders may know missiles exist without knowing readiness or warhead status.
Public strength can trap leaders. Denying disaster makes later transparency harder. Threatening retaliation can narrow diplomatic options.
Experts matter, but politics filters expertise. Scientists need authority to challenge official narratives. Intelligence analysts must communicate confidence and uncertainty.
Verification builds legitimacy. International radiation data and inspections increase trust. Missile removal and non-invasion guarantees require proof.
The affected population is not passive. Pripyat residents, workers, doctors, and local officials bear the cost. Cuba is a sovereign actor, not merely a superpower bargaining space.

Most important strategic advice. Do not treat secrecy and transparency as simple opposites. In both crises, total secrecy is dangerous, but careless disclosure can also create panic, provoke escalation, or reveal sources. The best delegates will argue for controlled transparency: release what protects lives and supports de-escalation, while protecting details that would create new danger.

8. Model Crisis Documents

8.1 Model Directive

Directive Template

Title: Immediate Radiation / Intelligence Verification Order

Sponsors: [Names]

Operative Action: [Specific order]

Authority: [Who executes it]

Timeline: [When]

Resources: [What is needed]

Verification: [How success is checked]

Risk: [What could go wrong]

Example - Chernobyl. The committee orders an immediate cross-check of radiation readings from plant instruments, military dosimeters, hospital reports, and independent scientific teams. Results must be delivered to the Emergency Commission within two hours and divided into confirmed, probable, and unverified categories.

Example - Cuban Missile Crisis. The committee orders all naval units enforcing the quarantine to use repeated non-lethal warning signals before any force is considered. Any submarine contact must be reported to civilian leadership before escalation unless a vessel is under direct attack.

8.2 Model Public Communique

Public Communique Template

1. What we know.

2. What we do not yet know.

3. What the public / international community should do now.

4. What the committee is doing to verify information.

5. When the next update will be provided.

Good public communication avoids two failures: panic through exaggeration and distrust through denial. Use plain language, acknowledge uncertainty, and promise a specific next update.

8.3 Model Intelligence Brief

Section What to write
Source Satellite image, intercepted signal, embassy report, eyewitness, technical measurement, diplomatic message.
Confidence High, medium, low - explain why.
Competing interpretations At least two plausible explanations.
Policy relevance What decisions depend on this information?
Recommended next step Verify, release, classify, delay, negotiate, evacuate, inspect, or de-escalate.

9. Glossary

Term Student-friendly meaning
Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) Illness caused by receiving a high dose of radiation over a short period.
Backchannel Secret or unofficial route for communication or negotiation.
Brinkmanship Pushing a conflict close to disaster to force the other side to retreat.
Classified information Information restricted for security, political, or operational reasons.
Communique Official public statement issued by a committee, state, or organisation.
Containment Actions to limit the spread of danger, such as radiation, panic, or escalation.
De-escalation Reducing the intensity or risk of a crisis.
Directive Short, action-oriented crisis document.
Epistemic security Protection of trustworthy processes by which information is produced, verified, shared, and used.
Exclusion zone Area from which people are removed or restricted because of contamination or danger.
IMINT Imagery intelligence, such as aerial or satellite photographs.
KGB Soviet state security and intelligence service.
Liquidators Workers, soldiers, firefighters, miners, engineers, and others who helped contain and clean up Chernobyl.
Quarantine U.S. term for the naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis; chosen partly to avoid declaring war.
Rules of engagement Instructions that define when military force may or may not be used.
SIGINT Signals intelligence derived from electronic signals, communications, radar, or weapons systems.
Verification Process of confirming whether a claim, withdrawal, evacuation, or report is true.
Crisis Update A breaking development issued by the dais that requires immediate response.
Intelligence Brief A structured report that summarises uncertain, classified, or contested information.
Portfolio Power A role-specific asset, authority, or ability activated through private notes.
Private Note A confidential message to the dais used to request information, activate a portfolio power, or carry out a secret action.
Public Deliberation Open debate in which delegates persuade, negotiate, develop proposals, and shape the official record.
Backroom / Portfolio Track The private side of crisis committee work, where delegates use role-specific leverage through the dais.

Pronunciation Guide

These approximate pronunciations are included to help delegates speak confidently during debate. They are simplified for accessibility rather than strict linguistic precision.

Name / Term Approximate Pronunciation
Chernobyl chur-NOH-bil
Pripyat PRI-pyat
Gorbachev GOR-buh-chov
Shcherbina shcher-BEE-nah
Legasov leh-GAH-sov
Bryukhanov brew-KHAH-nov
Khrushchev KROOSH-chev
McNamara mak-nuh-MAR-uh
Gromyko gro-MEE-ko
Dobrynin dob-RIN-in
U Thant oo THANT
SIGINT SIG-int

10. Select Webography

Use the sources below to support factual claims in speeches, directives, and final frameworks.

How to use the webography. The sources below are selected for educational reliability, primary-source value, or student accessibility. Start with the "Core sources" for each module. Use the expanded sources for portfolio research, advanced speeches, and crisis updates. Do not treat all sources as equal: official reports and primary archives are stronger for factual claims; journalism is useful for narrative and public reaction; commentary is useful for interpretation.

10.1 Conceptual Sources: Epistemic Security and Information Integrity

Elizabeth Seger - Epistemic Security. - Clear definition of epistemic security as the protection and improvement of information processes. https://elizabethseger.com/epistemic-security/

OECD - Governance responses to disinformation. - Useful for linking historical crisis communication to modern information integrity. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/08/governance-responses-to-disinformation_6285c78a/d6237c85-en.pdf

Open Government Partnership - Disinformation and Information Integrity. - Accessible policy framing on trust, public information, and open government. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-gov-guide/digital-governance-disinformation-and-information-integrity/

Lewandowsky et al. - Misinformation and the epistemic integrity of democracy. - Useful background for discussing why reliable public knowledge matters. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7615327/

10.2 Chernobyl Webography

IAEA INSAG-7 - The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1. - Core technical source; explains reactor design, operator actions, and safety culture. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf

UNSCEAR - The Chornobyl Accident. - Best concise UN source on radiation exposure and health effects. https://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html

WHO - Radiation: The Chernobyl accident. - Student-friendly Q&A on health effects and long-term concerns. https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/radiation-the-chernobyl-accident

WHO - Health effects of the Chernobyl accident: an overview. - Useful for health, thyroid cancer, psychological and social impact. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/publications/health-effects-of-the-chernobyl-accident.pdf

OECD NEA - Chernobyl Chapter I: The site and accident sequence. - Clear sequence of events; useful for timeline construction. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_28271/chernobyl-chapter-i-the-site-and-accident-sequence

OECD NEA - Chernobyl Chapter IX: Lessons learnt. - Connects accident to emergency planning and safety culture. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_28391/chernobyl-chapter-ix-lessons-learnt

IAEA - Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. - Key source for international notification after Chernobyl. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-early-notification-nuclear-accident

IAEA - Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. - Useful for final protocol language about assistance. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-assistance-case-nuclear-accident-or-radiological-emergency

IAEA Bulletin - Monitoring the fallout. - Explains how Sweden detected Chernobyl fallout. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull28-3/28302793032.pdf

IAEA - Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident. - Detailed environmental source for contamination, ecosystems, and long-term monitoring. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1239_web.pdf

National Security Archive - Top Secret Chernobyl, Volume 1. - Declassified Soviet and U.S. documents; excellent for secrecy and information control. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nunn-lugar-russia-programs/2019-08-15/top-secret-chernobyl-nuclear-disaster-through-eyes-soviet-politburo-kgb-us-intelligence

National Security Archive - Top Secret Chernobyl, Volume 2. - Shows Soviet awareness of reactor design problems and post-accident management. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2020-05-15/top-secret-chernobyl-nuclear-disaster-through-eyes-soviet-politburo-kgb-us-intelligence-volume-2

FRUS - Chernobyl aftermath and Western Europe. - Useful for U.S. diplomatic view of Scandinavian anger and Soviet notification failure. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v05/d220

IAEA - Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts. - Summarises Chernobyl Forum conclusions; useful but should be read critically with UNSCEAR/WHO. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/chernobyl.pdf

Atomic Archive - Chernobyl Timeline. - Accessible student timeline; use alongside official sources. https://www.atomicarchive.com/science/power/chernobyl-timeline.html

World Nuclear Association - Chernobyl Accident 1986. - Clear factual summary and numbers; note that it is an industry source. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission - Health effects of Chornobyl accident. - Accessible overview of health effects; useful for student-facing explanation. https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/resources/health/health-effects-chornobyl-accident/

10.3 Cuban Missile Crisis Webography

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library - Cuban Missile Crisis. - Best student-friendly entry point for the thirteen days. https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis

U.S. Office of the Historian - Cuban Missile Crisis. - Reliable diplomatic overview, including communications and miscommunications. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis

NSA - Cuban Missile Crisis SIGINT history. - Essential source for the role and limits of SIGINT. https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/coldwar/cuban_missile_crisis.pdf

National Security Archive - Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60 Sourcebook. - Large declassified sourcebook for advanced research. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sourcebook/cuban-missile-crisis-60

National Security Archive - The 59-day nuclear crisis. - Challenges the simple thirteen-day narrative; notes hidden warheads. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book-special-exhibit/cuba-cuban-missile-crisis-russia-programs/2022-10-04/cuban-missile

National Security Archive - First U-2 photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba. - Primary imagery source for the intelligence breakthrough. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29153-oct-14-first-u-2-photographs-soviet-missiles-cuba-1962

U.S. National Archives - Aerial Photograph of Missiles in Cuba. - Student-friendly primary document page on missile photography. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/aerial-photograph-of-missiles-in-cuba

Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum - The Cuban Missile Crisis. - Good contextual source on U-2 flights and aerial reconnaissance. https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/cuban-missile-crisis

FRUS - Discussion of the Turkey missile problem. - Useful for the secret-compromise dimension. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d90

FRUS - Khrushchev message to Kennedy, 28 October 1962. - Primary diplomatic source for the settlement language. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d102

JFK Library CMC Microsite - 26 October. - Daily timeline and documents for the first compromise offer. https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct26/

JFK Library CMC Microsite - Khrushchev letter, 27 October. - Primary source for the Turkey-Cuba comparison and escalation of demands. https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/doc4.html

National Security Archive - Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis. - Essential for B-59, nuclear torpedoes, and accidental escalation. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2022-10-03/soviet-submarines-nuclear-torpedoes-cuban-missile-crisis

JFK Library - U Thant correspondence, October 1962. - Primary source set for UN mediation. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-064-014

Walter Dorn - Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis. - Accessible scholarly interpretation of U Thant's role. https://walterdorn.net/pub/144-unsung-mediator-u-thant-cuban-missile-crisis-abstract

National Security Archive - Cuban Missile Crisis audio clips. - Useful for hearing decision-making as it unfolded. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/audio.htm

NSA Cryptologic Quarterly - A SIGINT Perspective. - Additional source on SIGINT limits and contributions. https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-quarterly/Cuban_Missile_Crisis.pdf

Intelligence.gov - How the Intelligence Community Works. - Useful for explaining planning, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation. https://www.intelligence.gov/how-the-ic-works

NSA - Signals Intelligence Overview. - Clear definition of SIGINT for the glossary. https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/

National Security Archive - Last nuclear weapons left Cuba in December 1962. - Important for showing that the danger lasted beyond the public crisis. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/

10.4 Further Research Sources for Advanced Delegates

Tackling threats to informed decision-making in democratic societies: promoting epistemic security in a technologically-advanced world - Abertay University, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://rke.abertay.ac.uk/en/publications/tackling-threats-to-informed-decision-making-in-democratic-societ/

Epistemic Security 2029: Fortifying the UK's Information Supply Chain to tackle the democratic emergency - Demos, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Epistemic-Security-2029_accessible.pdf

Written evidence - BBC0095 - UK Parliament Committees, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/166306/html/

Resilient Information Ecosystems - Demos, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://demos.co.uk/our-approach/resilient-information-ecosystems/

RBMK - Wikipedia, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RBMK

Deputy Head of the 6th Department of the KGB Administration Lieut. Col. Aksenov, 'Notice of Emergency Incident, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://site.nhd.org/17177793/uploaded/chernobyleffects.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report: Collection on Chernobyl Disaster | National Security Archive, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20276-national-security-archive-doc-02-central

Chernobyl: The Safety Test — What Really Happened - VastBlue Innovations, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.vastblueinnovations.com/editorial/what-really-happened/chernobyl

RBMK Reactors – Appendix to Nuclear Power Reactors - World Nuclear Association, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/appendices/rbmk-reactors

Sequence of Events – Chernobyl Accident Appendix 1 - World Nuclear Association, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/appendices/chernobyl-accident-appendix-1-sequence-of-events

IAEA Publications - Details, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PubDetAR.asp?pubId=3786

The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 - Scientific, technical publications in the nuclear field | IAEA, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTcd/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf

INSAG-7. The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1 - INIS-IAEA, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://inis.iaea.org/records/92ygd-jqm69

From Archives of VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB Chernobyl Tragedy in Documents and Materials, accessed on July 7, 2026, http://www.rri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/NSRG/reports/kr139/pdf/tykhyy-2.pdf

Ukrainian Archives for Researchers in Soviet and post-Soviet History and Politics Central State Archive of Supreme Bodies of Po, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/bridge-project/BUDJERYN_References.pdf

National Security Agency Releases History of Cold War Intelligence Activities, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm

October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm - Project MUSE, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446359/summary

October 16, 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16

The Cuban Missile Crisis - resourcesforhistoryteachers - PBworks, accessed on July 7, 2026, http://resourcesforhistoryteachers.pbworks.com/w/page/125884667/The%20Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis

October 28, 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct28

Documentation: White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis - UCLA Social Sciences, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/CMCdocs.pdf

Historians of Cuban missile crisis to speak this week at IU Bloomington, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://news.iu.edu/live/news/24388-historians-of-cuban-missile-crisis-to-speak-this

The Armageddon Letters, accessed on July 7, 2026, http://www.armageddonletters.com/

ZERO: THE SURPRISING AND UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY RELEVANCE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.cigionline.org/documents/686/no.8.pdf

Be Khrushchev - The Armageddon Letters, accessed on July 7, 2026, http://www.armageddonletters.com/films/23.html

Soviet submarine officer who averted nuclear war honoured with prize - The Guardian, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-soviet-submarine-captain-who-averted-nuclear-war-awarded-future-of-life-prize

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 | National Security Archive, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/events/cuban-missile-crisis-1962?page=1

Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, 1986. Wilson Center Digital Archive - Fontes: Open Access Sources for Ukrainian History, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://sources-ukraine.huri.share.library.harvard.edu/items/show/3

Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.dccollection.share.library.harvard.edu/items/show/15801

Digital Archive, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/186/5118/Chernobyl_Minister.pdf

The Cuban Missile Crisis at 55 | National Security Archive, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba/2017-10-16/cuban-missile-crisis-us-planned-military-occupation-1962

Mapping the Past and Present of Ukraine - Esri, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/arcwatch/mapping-the-past-and-present-of-ukraine

Chernobyl/Chornobyl Project | MAPA Digital Atlas of Ukraine - Harvard University, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.gis.huri.harvard.edu/chornobyl

MAPA: Digital Atlas of Ukraine | Ukrainian Research Institute - Harvard University, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://www.huri.harvard.edu/mapa

One Minute to Midnight - Part IV: The Shootdown of Major Anderson, accessed on July 7, 2026, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/dobbs/anderson.htm

Government Offices of Sweden — Prime Ministers and terms of office

UK Government — Past Prime Ministers

Delegate Final Preparation Checklist

  • I can explain my role's public position in one sentence.

  • I know what my role is likely to know, suspect, and not know at the start of each module.

  • I have prepared at least two questions for scientists/intelligence roles.

  • I have one public speech and one private note idea for Chernobyl.

  • I have one public speech and one private note idea for the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • I can distinguish confirmed facts, reasonable assumptions, and propaganda.

  • I know at least three sources from the webography that support my role's arguments.

  • I understand that the aim is not to repeat history, but to make plausible decisions under historical pressure.

Final lesson: Information is power, but verified information is responsibility.