1st Middle School of Pylaia
4 Isminis Str.
Pylaia, Thessaloniki - 55535
PyleaMUN Logo
PyleaMUN 2027
+30 2310329199
pyleamun@gmail.com
https://pyleamun.github.io/pyleaMUN2027/

UN General Assembly Study Guide

The Universal Right to Truth

Establishing international norms against state-sponsored disinformation in the post-truth era.

Official Committee Designation

Committee: UN General Assembly (UNGA)

Topic: The Universal Right to Truth: Establishing International Norms Against State-Sponsored Disinformation

Addressing the "Post-Truth" era and debating whether access to factual information is a human right.

Quick Navigation

1. Personal Introduction

Dear Delegates,

My name is Evangelos Papadopoulos and I am proud to be serving as the President of The General Assembly(PGA) for this year's PYLEAMUN. Having participated in several MUN conferences, I have developed the leadership and communication skills needed for a senior role in this organization. I hope that this Study Guide finds you well and I encourage all delegates to review the provided material to ensure they are fully prepared . Feel free to contact me regarding any issues you might come across! See you soon!!!!

Contact email: vnglspapadopoulos@gmail.com

Dear Delegates,

My name is Ioanna Zarogianni and I am enrolled in the 11th grade at the 1st Model Highschool of Thessaloniki “Manolis Andronikos”. I am immensely honored to serve as the Deputy President of the General Assembly at the 2nd PyleaMUN. To begin with, I would like to warmly welcome all delegates to this year’s UNGA and to inform you that this conference is set to bring out the best of your debating skills and critical thinking while also providing new experiences and friendships. Whether this is your first Model United Nations conference or one of many, I hope you will be able to experience MUN with the same passion, joy and fulfillment as I do. This year’s agenda topic is one of “The Universal Right to Truth: Establishing International Norms Against State-Sponsored Disinformation”; I strongly urge all delegates to treat this study guide as their primary resource with very specific and designed details to help you understand the topic clearly, allowing you to contribute more confidently and constructively to debate. However, conducting your own independent research on your county’s policy regarding the topic later on is highly encouraged. Alongside the rest of the executive board, I am committed to fostering a diplomatic and intellectually stimulated environment while making sure that everyone feels respected and comfortable. Should you have any questions or issues regarding your preparation or the topic itself, feel free to contact me via email.

See you on February!!

Contact email: joannazarogianni@gmail.com

2. Introduction to the Topic

The United Nations General Assembly is the only principal organ of the United Nations in which all Member States are represented. This makes it the most appropriate forum for debating universal norms on disinformation, public access to factual information and the protection of democratic debate. The question before delegates is whether the international community should move towards recognising access to truthful information as a human right, or whether existing rights, especially freedom of expression and the right to information, are sufficient when properly enforced.

The topic arises from the so-called "Post-Truth" era, in which emotional narratives, manipulated images, coordinated online campaigns and algorithmically amplified rumours can often spread faster than verified facts. Disinformation is not new: states have always used propaganda, secrecy and deception. What has changed is the speed, scale and precision of the digital information environment. Social media platforms, encrypted networks, artificial intelligence systems and targeted advertising allow state-linked actors to influence foreign audiences, polarise societies, discredit institutions and obscure responsibility for human rights abuses.

This guide uses the phrase "Universal Right to Truth" carefully. International law already recognises a strong right to truth in specific contexts, especially for victims of gross human rights violations, enforced disappearances and armed conflict. However, there is not yet a single, self-contained human right to be free from all false or misleading information. Delegates must therefore consider whether the General Assembly should develop new norms that combine the right to truth, the right to seek and receive information, freedom of expression, electoral integrity and state responsibility for covert manipulation.

The main challenge is balance. A resolution that gives governments broad power to decide what is true may become a tool of censorship. A resolution that does nothing may leave citizens, journalists and democratic institutions vulnerable to organised deception. Successful debate should therefore focus not on punishing ordinary mistakes, satire or political disagreement, but on countering intentional, coordinated, deceptive information operations carried out by or on behalf of states.

3. Definition of Key Terms

Right to truth: A legal and moral principle according to which victims, families and societies are entitled to know the facts about serious human rights violations, the fate of victims and the responsibility of perpetrators.

Right to information: The right of individuals to seek, receive and access information, especially information held by public authorities or needed for public participation.

Factual information: Information that can be tested against evidence, records, observations or reliable sources, unlike opinion or value judgement.

Misinformation: False or inaccurate information shared without necessarily intending to cause harm.

Disinformation: False, misleading or manipulated information shared deliberately in order to deceive, influence or cause harm.

Malinformation: Genuine information shared in a misleading or harmful context, for example through selective leaks, harassment or doxxing.

State-sponsored disinformation: A coordinated information operation planned, funded, directed or tolerated by a state or state-linked actor with the aim of deceiving domestic or foreign audiences.

Propaganda: Organised communication designed to promote a political goal, often by simplifying complex issues, appealing to emotions or suppressing inconvenient facts.

Information integrity: A policy concept referring to an information environment in which people can access reliable, plural and evidence-based information while enjoying freedom of expression.

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI): A term often used in European policy to describe manipulative behaviour by foreign actors that is intentional, coordinated and harmful to democratic processes.

Coordinated inauthentic behaviour: The use of networks of fake accounts, bots or deceptive identities to make a campaign appear more popular, spontaneous or credible than it really is.

Algorithmic amplification: The way platform recommendation systems may increase the visibility of certain content because it produces engagement, even when that content is misleading or harmful.

Deepfake: Synthetic audio, image or video generated or altered by AI to make a person appear to say or do something they did not say or do.

Generative AI: AI systems capable of producing new text, images, audio, video or code based on patterns learned from large datasets.

Media and information literacy: The skills needed to find, evaluate, verify, create and share information responsibly.

Freedom of expression: The right to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Legality, necessity and proportionality: The test used in human rights law to judge whether restrictions on expression are lawful, pursue a legitimate aim and go no further than necessary.

Attribution: The process of linking an information operation to a specific actor, such as a state agency, proxy group or coordinated network.

Public-interest journalism: Journalism that informs the public about matters of civic importance, including government conduct, corruption, elections, conflict, health and human rights.

Content moderation: The rules and practices used by platforms to label, reduce, remove or otherwise manage user-generated content.

5. Timeline of Key Events

DateEventRelevance
1948Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted.Article 19 establishes the universal language of seeking, receiving and imparting information.
1966International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted.Article 19 becomes a binding treaty obligation for States Parties.
1977Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions recognises families right to know the fate of missing relatives in armed conflict.An early treaty expression of truth as a legal interest.
2005UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation adopted.Connects truth with remedy, justice and guarantees of non-recurrence.
2006Convention on Enforced Disappearance adopted.Article 24 gives victims the right to know the truth about disappearances.
2010UN General Assembly creates the International Day for the Right to the Truth.Shows General Assembly recognition of truth in the context of gross human rights violations.
2011Human Rights Committee issues General Comment No. 34 on Article 19.Clarifies that restrictions on expression must be exceptional and proportionate.
2016-2017Major debates over election interference and online propaganda intensify.Raises the problem of foreign influence operations in democratic systems.
2020COVID-19 pandemic and global "infodemic".Demonstrates how false information can endanger health and public trust.
2022Russia full-scale invasion of Ukraine accompanied by large-scale information warfare.Shows how disinformation can be used to justify aggression and confuse international audiences.
2022EU Digital Services Act adopted.Regional shift towards systemic platform accountability.
2023UNESCO publishes Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms.Provides a human-rights-based model for platform governance.
2024UN launches Global Principles for Information Integrity and Member States adopt the Global Digital Compact.Information integrity becomes a central UN digital-governance issue.

6. Current Situation

6.1 The "Post-Truth" challenge

The term "Post-Truth" does not mean that truth has disappeared. Rather, it describes a political environment in which verifiable facts compete with emotional narratives, conspiracy theories, identity-based messaging and manipulated media. In such an environment, the public may lose trust not only in a specific fact, but in the possibility of shared truth itself. This weakens democratic debate because citizens cannot hold leaders accountable if they cannot agree on basic evidence.

State-sponsored disinformation is especially dangerous because it combines political intent with resources, diplomatic cover and sometimes intelligence capabilities. It can be directed at foreign elections, ethnic tensions, migration, public health, climate policy, armed conflicts or human rights investigations. The goal is often not to convince everyone of one false story, but to create confusion, cynicism and distrust.

6.2 Social media platforms and algorithmic amplification

Social media companies are now central actors in the public sphere. Their recommendation systems decide which posts, videos and links millions of people see first. When a state-linked campaign uses emotionally charged or divisive material, the platform may unintentionally amplify it because it keeps users engaged. A human-rights-based approach therefore asks platforms to be transparent about advertising, recommender systems, takedowns, account networks and crisis responses.

At the same time, leaving decisions entirely to private companies is not enough. Platforms may be more accountable to shareholders than to citizens. Their moderation decisions may be inconsistent, opaque or biased. Delegates must therefore consider whether independent regulators, audit systems, civil society observers or UN reporting mechanisms should be created to ensure accountability without creating state censorship.

6.3 AI, deepfakes and verification

AI-generated disinformation creates verification problems for journalists, election authorities and ordinary users. A fake video released shortly before an election or a ceasefire negotiation may spread before it can be disproven. Synthetic audio can be used to impersonate public officials. AI translation tools can also help a disinformation campaign operate in many languages at once.

Potential responses include provenance standards, watermarking, labelling of political deepfakes, emergency correction channels and support for independent fact-checking. However, technical detection is imperfect. A resolution should therefore avoid relying solely on automated detection and should include due process, appeals and independent review.

Type of information problemExampleSuitable response
Ordinary errorA user shares an incorrect statistic by mistake.Correction, media literacy and access to reliable sources.
MisinformationA rumour about a health measure spreads without clear malicious intent.Public-interest communication and trusted community messengers.
DisinformationA coordinated network spreads forged documents to discredit an election.Investigation, transparency, platform action and possible sanctions if state-linked.
MalinformationPrivate data or real images are leaked selectively to harass a journalist.Privacy protection, legal remedies and platform enforcement.
State propagandaA state media outlet repeats a one-sided political narrative.Counter-speech, media pluralism and labelling of state affiliation.
Covert FIMI operationFake local accounts secretly funded by a foreign government target voters.Disclosure rules, attribution support, election protection and diplomatic response.
AI deepfakeSynthetic video of a candidate or military leader released during a crisis.Provenance tools, rapid verification channels and clear platform procedures.

7. Key Case Studies

7.1 COVID-19 and the infodemic

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that false information can become a public health threat. Claims about fake cures, vaccine conspiracies and fabricated government measures undermined trust in health authorities and placed lives at risk. The case shows that access to reliable information can be connected to the rights to life and health. It also shows the danger of overreaction, as some governments used the pandemic to criminalise criticism or expand surveillance.

7.2 Russia-Ukraine and wartime information operations

Russia's war against Ukraine has been accompanied by narratives denying Ukrainian statehood, spreading false claims about atrocities and attempting to confuse audiences about responsibility for attacks. Ukraine and its partners have responded with strategic communication, sanctions, platform cooperation and documentation of war crimes. This case illustrates the connection between disinformation, aggression, human rights violations and the right of societies to know the truth about conflict.

7.3 Elections and foreign interference

Elections are particularly vulnerable because timing matters. False content released just before voting may influence voters before fact-checkers or courts can respond. State-linked actors may attempt to suppress turnout, inflame social divisions or discredit electoral authorities. A UNGA resolution could call for pre-election transparency measures, political-ad libraries, rapid response channels and international assistance to election bodies, while avoiding rules that silence opposition parties or independent media.

7.4 Climate and scientific disinformation

Scientific issues such as climate change are also targets of disinformation. State and private actors may exaggerate uncertainty, attack scientists or use misleading advertisements to delay policy action. This is relevant to the General Assembly because reliable information is necessary for the Sustainable Development Goals, disaster preparedness and international climate cooperation.

8. Major Parties Involved and Likely Positions

Actor or blocLikely prioritiesPossible concerns
European Union and like-minded democraciesPlatform transparency, election integrity, action against foreign interference, human-rights safeguards.May face criticism that platform regulation can become overreach or affect global speech standards.
United StatesProtection of free expression, countering foreign influence, voluntary or risk-based platform measures.May resist broad international rules that appear to empower governments to define truth.
RussiaSovereignty over information space and opposition to Western accusations of disinformation.May reject attribution claims and argue that anti-disinformation norms are used politically.
ChinaCyber sovereignty, state control over information flows and resistance to foreign interference.May favour strong state authority over platforms, raising free-expression concerns.
Global South and developing statesCapacity-building, digital inclusion, protection from foreign manipulation andMay worry that rules designed by powerful states or platforms ignore local contexts and languages.
respect for development priorities.
Small island and conflict-affected statesProtection from climate, disaster and security-related disinformation; support for trusted public communication.Often lack technical capacity to detect coordinated operations.
UNESCO, OHCHR and Special RapporteursFreedom of expression, access to information, media pluralism, journalist safety and human-rights-based platform governance.Will oppose vague fake-news laws and blanket internet shutdowns.
Digital platforms and AI companiesOperational clarity, scalable moderation, advertising rules and technical standards for synthetic media.May resist burdensome disclosure, liability or independent access to data.
Civil society, journalists and fact-checkersTransparency, public-interest journalism, media literacy, protection of sources and accountability for abuses.May fear both disinformation and censorship in the name of fighting it.

9. Previous Attempts to Address the Issue

9.1 United Nations and UNESCO initiatives

The UN Global Principles for Information Integrity are an important soft-law development. They call for action by governments, platforms, advertisers, public relations firms, media and civil society to reduce incentives for disinformation and hate while respecting human rights. The Global Digital Compact also places digital trust, safety and human rights within broader multilateral digital cooperation.

UNESCO has developed guidelines for digital platform governance. These emphasise freedom of expression, access to information, multistakeholder oversight, transparency and human-rights due diligence. They are not a treaty, but they provide delegates with a balanced model: platforms should be accountable, yet states should avoid arbitrary, disproportionate or purely censorship-based responses.

9.2 Regional and national laws

The European Union Digital Services Act is one of the most advanced regional attempts to regulate online platforms. It requires very large platforms to assess systemic risks, provide greater transparency, allow researcher access and address risks connected to elections and civic discourse. The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation also encourages platform commitments on advertising transparency, demonetisation of disinformation and fact-checking cooperation.

Other national approaches are more controversial. Some states have adopted broad laws against "fake news" or "false information" that give authorities power to order removals, corrections or criminal penalties. These laws may be used to protect public order, but they can also suppress journalists, activists and opposition voices. Delegates should learn from these cases by drafting definitions narrowly and adding strong safeguards.

9.3 Civil society and fact-checking networks

Independent fact-checkers, investigative journalists, universities and civil society organisations play a crucial role in identifying false claims and exposing coordinated networks. Their work is strongest when they are independent of government and when platforms provide meaningful access to data. A UNGA resolution could support cross-border research, emergency verification networks and funding for public-interest media in vulnerable regions.

10. Challenges to Creating International Norms

  • Definition: false information, propaganda, satire, opinion and deliberate disinformation are

often difficult to separate in law.

  • Freedom of expression: a right to truth must not become a governmental licence to censor

criticism or unpopular political views.

  • Attribution: proving that a campaign is sponsored or directed by a state can be technically and

politically difficult.

  • Jurisdiction: online operations cross borders, while law enforcement and media regulation

usually remain national.

  • Platform access: researchers and regulators often lack reliable access to platform data,

algorithms and advertising archives.

  • AI speed and scale: synthetic media can be created and distributed faster than fact-checking

systems can respond.

  • Unequal capacity: developing states may lack technical teams, independent media funding or

digital literacy programmes.

  • Political incentives: powerful states may condemn disinformation by rivals while using similar

techniques themselves.

  • Public trust: excessive state control may reduce trust further, while inaction may allow

manipulation to spread unchecked.

11. Possible Solutions

11.1 A UNGA Declaration on Information Integrity and the Right to Truth

  • Affirm that access to reliable information is essential for human dignity, democratic

participation, public health, peace and sustainable development.

  • Recognise the existing right to truth for victims of gross human rights violations while

encouraging further development of norms on public access to factual information.

  • Define state-sponsored disinformation narrowly as intentional, coordinated and deceptive

conduct by or on behalf of a state, rather than mere error or dissent.

  • Require every anti-disinformation measure to include safeguards for legality, necessity,

proportionality, non-discrimination and independent review.

11.2 Platform and algorithmic transparency

  • Encourage large platforms to maintain public political-ad libraries, disclose state-affiliated

media labels and report coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

  • Create standards for independent researcher access to platform data, with privacy safeguards

and protection for vulnerable users.

  • Require risk assessments before major platform changes, during elections, conflicts, public

health emergencies and other high-risk moments.

  • Promote clear notice-and-appeal mechanisms when content is removed, labelled or reduced in

visibility.

11.3 AI and synthetic media safeguards

  • Support provenance tools, watermarking and labelling for AI-generated political or

public-interest content while recognising that detection is imperfect.

  • Establish rapid verification channels between election authorities, platforms, journalists and

civil society during high-risk periods.

  • Discourage the use of AI-generated impersonation of public officials, candidates, journalists or

humanitarian actors.

  • Fund public-interest research on deepfake detection in multiple languages and low-resource

media environments.

11.4 Media literacy and public resilience

  • Integrate media and information literacy into school curricula, adult education and

public-service campaigns.

  • Support independent public-interest journalism, local media and fact-checking networks,

especially in under-resourced languages and regions.

  • Protect journalists, whistleblowers, archives and access-to-information systems as part of the

infrastructure of truth.

  • Create public emergency communication plans that provide timely, transparent and

evidence-based information during crises.

11.5 International cooperation and accountability

  • Request the Secretary-General to produce regular reports on foreign information manipulation,

state-sponsored disinformation and best practices for rights-respecting responses.

  • Encourage states to disclose state-funded foreign influence activities and prohibit covert

payments, fake media fronts and deceptive impersonation.

  • Consider targeted sanctions or diplomatic measures against officials and entities credibly linked

to serious cross-border information operations.

  • Develop capacity-building programmes so smaller states can detect coordinated campaigns,

protect elections and communicate verified information.

12. Questions a Resolution Must Answer

  • 1. Should the General Assembly recognise access to factual information as a human right, or

should it strengthen existing rights to truth, information and expression?

  • 2. How can delegates define state-sponsored disinformation without criminalising ordinary

error, satire, journalism or political disagreement?

  • 3. What forms of state conduct should be prohibited: covert funding, fake accounts, forged

documents, deepfakes, bot networks or all of the above?

  • 4. How should a resolution balance the right to truth with freedom of expression under ICCPR

Article 19?

  • 5. Should platforms be required to disclose how their algorithms amplify political content?
  • 6. What obligations should platforms have during elections, armed conflicts and public health

emergencies?

  • 7. How can AI-generated political deepfakes be labelled or restricted without limiting legitimate

expression?

  • 8. Who should determine attribution when an information operation is suspected to be

state-sponsored?

  • 9. What role should UNESCO, OHCHR, the Secretary-General or an independent expert

mechanism play in monitoring information integrity?

  • 10. How can developing states receive technical assistance without accepting external control

over their information space?

  • 11. Should there be consequences for states that repeatedly sponsor covert disinformation

campaigns abroad?

  • 12. How can public-interest journalism, archives, education and media literacy be protected as

long-term pillars of the right to truth?

13. Bibliography and Useful Research Starting Points

Delegates should use these sources as starting points and then research the position, domestic laws and diplomatic priorities of their assigned country. The bibliography prioritises United Nations documents, human-rights standards, UNESCO materials, regional platform-governance models and selected academic literature.

  • 1. United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

  • 2. OHCHR. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

  • 3. Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 34: Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and

Expression.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-com

ment-no-34-article-19-freedoms-opinion-and-expression

  • 4. OHCHR. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced

Disappearance.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-all-persons-enforced-disappearance

  • 5. United Nations General Assembly. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy

and Reparation, A/RES/60/147. https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/147

  • 6. United Nations General Assembly. International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning

Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims, A/RES/65/196.

https://undocs.org/A/RES/65/196

  • 7. United Nations. Global Principles for Information Integrity.

https://www.un.org/en/information-integrity

  • 8. United Nations. Global Digital Compact. https://www.un.org/techenvoy/global-digital-compact
  • 9. United Nations General Assembly. Human rights in the context of digital technologies,

A/RES/78/213. https://undocs.org/A/RES/78/213

  • 10. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Disinformation and freedom

of opinion and expression, A/HRC/47/25. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/47/25

  • 11. UNESCO. Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms.

https://www.unesco.org/en/internet-conference/guidelines

  • 12. UNESCO. Media and Information Literacy.

https://www.unesco.org/en/media-information-literacy

  • 13. UNESCO. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development.

https://www.unesco.org/reports/world-media-trends

  • 14. World Health Organization. Infodemic management.

https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic

  • 15. OSCE, UN, OAS and ACHPR Special Mandates. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression

and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda. https://www.osce.org/fom/302796

  • 16. European Union. Digital Services Act.

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act

  • 17. European Union. Code of Practice on Disinformation.

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation

  • 18. European External Action Service. Tackling Foreign Information Manipulation and

Interference.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tackling-disinformation-foreign-information-manipulation-i

nterference_en

  • 19. Council of Europe. Freedom of Expression. https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression
  • 20. Freedom House. Freedom on the Net. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net
  • 21. International Panel on the Information Environment. Scientific knowledge for the information

environment. https://www.ipie.info/

  • 22. RAND Corporation. Truth Decay. https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay.html
  • 23. Naqvi, Yasmin. The right to the truth in international law: fact or fiction? International Review

of the Red Cross, 2006.

https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/right-truth-international-law-fact-or-fiction

  • 24. Sweeney, James A. The Elusive Right to Truth in Transitional Human Rights Jurisprudence.

International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2018.

  • 25. Klinkner, Melanie and Davis, Howard. The Right to the Truth in International Law.

Routledge, 2019.

  • 26. Luceri, Luca and Ferrara, Emilio. Research on coordinated disinformation and information

operations. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13466